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1 Introduction 
In December 2008, the Greater Manchester (UK) electorate voted to reject a £3 billion 
funding package including wide-ranging investment in the conurbation’s transport 
infrastructure, together with, and partially funded by, congestion charging. The vote 
followed a two-year period of debating and campaigning, upon which this chapter 
reflects. The chapter focuses in particular on the ways in which the plans were 
communicated to the Greater Manchester public and the governmental, political and 
media context in which they were debated. 
It adds to work by the author and others [1–4], providing a deeper analysis and 
reflecting on subsequent developments. By investigating the parameters of the debate 
and exploring the implications of the vote, it makes a contribution to the under-
researched field of transport policy development in Greater Manchester through a 
highly significant case study in which tensions and political differences over the future 
of transport in the area are brought to the surface. It therefore contributes to 
international literature on sustainable transport in general, and road pricing in 
particular, and to the understanding of how to pursue policy developments even when 
they can be controversial and portrayed as ‘anti-car’. 
Given his personal involvement in the decision-making process, the author had access 
to sources additional to those normally available through a desk exercise. These 
include insider discussions, attendance of meetings of campaign groups and public 
debates, conversation with the public during campaigning activities, and campaign 
materials, such as leaflets and posters, that are not available in public archives. The 
author was personally engaged in the debate through a group that was part of the 
campaign supporting the plans. This affords a level of familiarity with, and closeness to, 
the field that would be difficult to achieve using retrospective approaches.  
The chapter begins by looking at the ways our relationship with transport is both a 
burden and - looking to the future - an opportunity. It considers the lens of car 
dependency and employs this as a way of understanding the potential contribution of 
Greater Manchester’s plans and to place them within the context of sustainable 
transport policy in the UK and internationally. It then looks at the reactions to the 
proposals, describing the viewpoints expressed by those in favour of and opposed to 
the plans. Particular challenges in progressing the plans are then explored, firstly in 
terms of media and communications and, secondly, government, business and politics. 
It then looks at the situation following the vote, firstly by outlining policy developments 
in Greater Manchester since 2008, and secondly through a discussion of implications 
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and lessons for road pricing as a whole: what does the experience mean for transport 
policy in Greater Manchester and other cities, and for our understanding of car 
dependency? 
2 Transport as Challenge and Opportunity 
Transport is at once the lifeblood of the our towns and cities and a burden to them, 
lubricating our economies and keeping people on the move whilst bringing with it a 
wide-ranging set of well-established impacts. Such impacts include environmental 
damage, such as climate change [5], local air pollution [6] and biodiversity loss; social 
issues including social exclusion [7], loss of community [8], and inactivity [9]; and 
economic impacts, including congestion [10] and healthcare costs [11].  
The notion of car dependency provides a useful lens [12] and Hickman and Banister [5 
pp36] argue that this is ‘still likely to be the reality, both now and in the short-term 
future’. In describing car dependency, commentators point to a vicious circle in which, 
as motorised traffic grows, and urban form shapes itself around it – sometimes dubbed 
‘carchitecture’ [11 pp41] - walking and cycling can become less attractive options [9], 
public transport becomes stuck in the same queues as the car, and “the fragmented 
city becomes hostile and can even force reluctant users into their cars, thus 
exacerbating the problem” [13 pp26]. The dominance of cars enables the speeding-up 
of common tasks – although congestion constraints limit this - such that “with the 
remaking of space around the car comes a restructuring of temporalities” and, as more 
journeys become difficult or impossible without private transport, the car can “create 
the conditions of its own necessity” [14 pp492].  
In car-dependent societies, lack of access to a car is a key defining factor in social 
exclusion [7], since it becomes increasingly necessary to own a car to access essential 
services such as education, healthcare and employment. In the most deprived wards in 
Manchester, 60% of households have no access to a car or van1. Across cities, 
communities enjoy varying levels of access to public transport networks, with 
implications for participation in society: ‘the availability or unavailability of transport… 
shapes people’s life opportunities’ [15 pp55].  High levels of private mobility can 
contribute to social exclusion through environmental degradation, health impacts and 
community severance [16]: those experiencing a lack of access to opportunities also 
suffer some of the worst impacts of the transport system – “they are both ‘less 
                                               
1 The 2011 UK Census results indicate that 44.5% of Greater Manchester households have 
‘no cars or vans in households’, and that figures for the Ardwick, Moss Side and Harpurhey 
wards are 63.3%, 60.2% and 58.3% respectively. Available at 
www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk.  
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travelled’ and more ‘travelled-upon’” [17 pp5]. The pervasiveness of the car, it is 
argued, instils a cultural acceptance of its costs [9]. 
Whilst the notion of car dependency is compelling, however, there are aspects of car 
use not directly related to utility. In this sense ‘the car is associated with both 
instrumental and affective emotions’ [5 pp32], implying that policy to promote 
alternatives to car-dependence need consider not only getting from A to B, but also the 
experience that car-based mobility offers and the culture that surrounds it. 
A range of measures are available to policy-makers. Santos et al. [18] divide these into 
physical policies, such as developing infrastructure for public transport, walking and 
cycling, and integrating with land use planning; soft policies, such as car sharing and 
car clubs, eco-driving training and awareness-raising; and knowledge policies, such as 
incentivising research and development into low-emissions and electric vehicles. 
Banister et al [19] classify policy approaches by their entry points into society, whether 
through lifestyle, market, regulation or public infrastructure and public transport. In the 
literature, there is increasing recognition of the importance of lifestyles and behaviours 
[20,21], and the importance of understanding transport as a socio-technical system 
[14,22]. 
Within this mix, road pricing and congestion charging are options that seek to 
disincentivise driving, at least at certain times and in certain places, and, through 
potential revenue generation, provide improved alternatives to the car. It is fair to say 
that this idea has long been considered a policy option but ‘has enjoyed only 
spasmodic success in terms of actual implementation, more often failing to construct 
any climate of acceptance, and instead generally experiencing public and political 
rejection’ [23 pp1145].  
As the contents of this book evidences, Manchester’s attempt to implement road 
pricing sits within an international story of the development of this approach. Prominent 
examples of implemented schemes include Gothenburg, Singapore, London, 
Stockholm, Milan and a set of Norwegian cities (chapters 6, 8, 14 and 18). Non-
implemented cases include Copenhagen, Hong Kong, New York, and Edinburgh [24–
26] (chapter 8). In Edinburgh, plans were developed but, like Manchester, were 
rejected in a public vote. In Copenhagen and New York the congestion charge was 
discussed and rejected by politicians [27]. 
Hong Kong ran a 21-month pilot stage trail of an electronic pricing system between 
1983 and 85 but public opposition meant that it was not continued [28]; Manville and 
King [29] reflected that voters did not believe government promises to rebate toll 
revenue to drivers; but see chapter 8, section 8.4.5, for more recent developments. In 
Edinburgh, car use appeared to be a clear determinant of voting against the plans and 
Gaunt, Rye and Allen identify a range of factors including complexity and limited public 
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understanding, lack of faith that this would be an effective solution to congestion, and 
even that the public transport improvements were ‘insufficient, irrelevant or ill-defined.’ 
[30 pp100] 
This chapter, then, contributes to ongoing work in understanding why schemes 
involving congestion charging often fail the public acceptability test, rather than the 
body of work that looks at the efficacy and impact of congestion charging itself. In 
reflecting on Manchester’s experiences, familiar themes of public trust, understanding 
and acceptance recur, and place it within this international debate, whilst particularities 
of political structure, spatial distribution and public transport provision emphasise the 
importance of situating the local within a global context. 
 
3 Greater Manchester’s Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) bid 
In July 2007 the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) placed a bid to 
the UK Government’s Transport Innovation Fund (referred to here as GMTIF). AGMA is 
the local government association for Greater Manchester, with representation from the 
ten boroughs in the conurbation. The decision to go ahead with the bid followed a 
period of public engagement. Less formalised discussion started earlier than this 
formal consultation, following the Manchester Evening News (M.E.N.) headline on 24th 
January 2007 “Congestion Charging: It’s coming our way” (Figure 7.1) [31]. 
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Figure 7.1 Front page of Manchester Evening News, 24th January 2007 
 
From a UK point of view, the plans followed the earlier introduction of congestion 
charging in London in 2003. This happened alongside significant improvements in an 
already well-regarded public transport system [32]. It was implemented by Mayor Ken 
Livingstone and represented a “highly visible, very deliberate, very political effort to 
reduce car use and congestion in the capital” [33 pp473].  
The Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) was aimed at local authorities and required a 
focus on demand management and anti-congestion packages, reflecting Government 
recognition of the London congestion charge combined, arguably, with reluctance to 
commit to a national scheme [34]. This followed a statement from Government to work 
alongside local authorities, with the Transport Act 2000 providing the necessary 
powers to local authorities to introduce charging regimes subject to approval by the 
Secretary of State (i.e. the Minister of Transport) [35]. 
In AGMA’s bid £1.5 billion from TIF would be made up to approximately £3 billion by 
borrowing on revenue from a congestion charge over 30 years [36].  This charging 
element was the most prominent part of the package, and would be weekday peak-
time only, in the direction of flow of peak-time traffic, chargeable on driving through 
either or both of two cordons. Depending on when and how many cordons were 
passed, the charge would be between £1 and £5 over a day (see schematic, Figure 
7.2).  
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Figure 7.2 Schematic illustration of proposed congestion charging regime. 
Based on billboard advertisement ‘Would you need to pay the congestion 
charge’ shown in [37]. The M60 is the outer motorway ring road around 
Manchester. 
In so far as the congestion charging element of the plans could be considered a ‘stick’, 
other elements of the plan could be recognised as complementary ‘carrots’, with 
incentives for public transport and active travel, including extensions to the Metrolink 
tram network, an expanded cycle lane network, additional yellow school buses, new 
train carriages, improved interchange facilities and better integration of the bus 
network. Such investment would create opportunities for currently car-dependent 
commuters to take other options.  
The plans included closer integration of services and smart ticketing and these, 
combined with an increase in the number and frequency of services, were intended to 
make public transport a more attractive proposition.  With the currently privatised, multi-
operator system of buses, trams and trains, the area can appear to have a collection of 
services rather than a network, a situation that has been observed in England and 
Wales outside of London [38].  
The plans also included personalised journey planning and promotional activities. 
These ‘soft measures’, aiming to bring about behavioural change through information 
about consequences and alternatives [18], were intended to act alongside the 
infrastructure improvements and help commuters explore options, helping to tackle 
some of the behavioural aspects of car dependency, such as lack of experience of 
public transport and confidence when cycling.  
4 The plans as response to the challenge of car-dependent 
cities 
The GMTIF plans can be understood to be a response to the challenges of car-
dependency in cities and as an attempt to mitigate the environmental and social impact 
of increasing car use. However, whilst with hindsight it is possible to see these 
potential societal impacts, it has been noted that the discourse around the referendum 
was focused heavily on economic dimensions: ‘given that one motivation for the 
proposed congestion charge scheme was protecting the environment through reducing 
car use, the campaign on the referendum had been overwhelmingly dominated, both 
online and off, by an economic discourse’ [39 pp89]. Nonetheless, references were 
made to broader societal goals, including reducing carbon emissions, improving air 
quality and reducing social exclusion. 
One way in which the plans responded to these challenges was the implication of 
modal shift. As mentioned, there was a clear ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ approach. By making 
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driving more expensive at certain times, and investing in more sustainable modes, the 
plans had the potential to bring about modal shift by, for example, “produc[ing] a 
virtuous cycle in shifting motorists to public transport” [18 pp53]. It should be noted 
however that the ‘stick’ was primarily a financial one - there was no impediment on 
driving provided the individual was willing to pay the charge – whereas the ‘carrots’ 
related to quality of experience rather than price – for example bus coverage and 
frequency, ticket integration, and cycle lane provision. 
In this sense the plans represented more than the provision of incentives and 
disincentives, since the intention was that they would give people more options to 
travel without a car. This can be understood in simple terms, in that new bus and tram 
routes would present the opportunity for some current car commuters to utilise public 
transport for some or all of their journeys – whether they would take this opportunity is 
of course a different matter, and some research has suggested that the provision of 
public transport itself does not affect vehicle kilometres travelled [40] . Similarly, new 
and improved cycle routes may have made cycling a more realistic or attractive option 
for some. At a more systemic level, indirect effects could be anticipated: a new school 
bus route may have freed a parent from driving a child to school, therefore reducing the 
need for trip chaining, making public transport a more viable option; reduced traffic 
levels during the rush hour could make walking and cycling a more attractive option. 
Moreover, GMTIF represented something more than a trickle of transport 
improvements, important as they are individually. It would have been a programme of 
major investment over a five-year period with substantial changes to the public 
transport offer in the conurbation followed by the introduction of the congestion charge. 
This would create opportunities for transport provision to be a high-profile news item, at 
least in the time leading up to the introduction of the charge; for the personalised 
journey planning service to help people consider their modal choices; for businesses to 
work with employees to help them think about their commute and potentially introduce 
flexible working policies to facilitate modal shift. Accepting, again, that they remain a 
theoretical possibility, they resonate with Hull’s [41 pp96] observation that the 
cumulative effects of car dependency  “warrant a coherent and focused intervention” 
and perhaps provide  “window[s] of opportunity in which travel habits (e.g. driving) are 
disrupted and must be renegotiated” [42 pp485]. In this sense, the impact of GMTIF 
would have been more than the sum of its parts. 
As a theoretical proposal, GMTIF contained within it many principles that transport 
researchers would associate with facilitating modal shift. This is not to claim that it was 
the perfect, complete package however. There were a number of omissions that could 
be seen as missed opportunities. For example, the plans contained nothing explicit that 
would encourage the use of cleaner vehicles. Whilst the publicity made claims around 
improvements in air quality and carbon emissions, the opportunity was not taken to 
reduce the congestion charge for electric or hybrid vehicles. There was also nothing 
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explicit to help people on low incomes, apart from a short term reduction on the 
congestion charge of 20 per cent for the first year [43]. Additionally, the authorities 
could not guarantee that public transport fares would be cheaper. 
In many ways the complexity of the GMTIF scheme reflects an attempt to overcome 
some of the criticisms commonly made of road charging, as Vigar et al. agree [2]. By 
using a loan to enable public transport improvements before introducing charging, 
there was potential to overcome a common ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma: public transport 
improvements being required upfront, yet the money from charging needed to fund 
them becoming available only downstream. The planned charging regime could be 
seen as less ‘blunt’ than, for example, the London charge, with the charge being 
incurred only when crossing one of the two cordons, only at certain times, and only in 
the direction of peak-time traffic. This meant that the charge was in principal more 
precisely targeted at congestion itself, at the times and directions it occurred, and as a 
result afforded more options to drive and avoid paying the congestion charge.  
5  Reactions to the proposals 
Once national Government had accepted the bid in June 2008, subject to public 
approval, there was a period of debate and a formal consultation on the proposals. 
Campaigning for and against had been continuing and there were calls for a 
referendum, particularly from opponents [44]. 
In July 2008, AGMA announced that there would be a referendum in December of that 
year. A representative sample survey of residents run by Ipsos Mori in August found 
before the referendum that just over half (53%) of residents were in favour of the 
Congestion Charge scheme [45]. However, the result announced on 12th December 
2008 was strongly against: 78.8% against and 21.2% for, with an overall voter turnout 
of 53.2% [46]. The proposals were therefore not implemented. The discrepancy 
between the opinion polls and the final result may stem from a number of factors: the 
time between them, which would have been the period of most intense campaigning, 
during which voters had time to change their minds; the likelihood of those with only a 
mild interest in the issue responding to the poll but not being motivated to vote; and the 
difference between an ‘in principle’ commitment in an opinion poll and a more 
calculative vote that feels more real and anticipates the ways the charge would ‘hit the 
pocket’. 
Although in the initial stages there were no plans for a referendum, ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ 
alliances formed, and these could be mapped onto the subsequent ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
positions. An early presence in the ‘pro’ campaign was Clean Air Now, a coalition led 
by environmental campaigners and later joined by the official ‘yes’ campaign and 
United City, a coalition of businesses. The ‘anti’ campaign was initiated by campaign 
group Manchester Against Road Tolls (MART), backed by the national Association of 
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British Drivers (ABD), and later joined by a coalition of businesses, the Greater 
Manchester Momentum Group (GMMG) [47]. Shark and squirrel characters became 
mascots for the ‘no’ and ‘yes’ campaigns respectively, with the shark attending 
consultation roadshows and appearing in viral videos taking money from people as 
they tried to buy a beer or go on holiday; the squirrel responding with the motto “Say no 
to £3billion? You must be nuts!”. The arenas for campaigning included the local press, 
with some newspapers taking particular campaigning stances; local radio and 
television; various organised public meetings; the tables of the area’s pubs, on beer 
mats; and billboards around the conurbation. 
As a methodological note, it is important to remember that the viewpoints expressed on 
either ‘side’ represent campaign messages rather than being, necessarily, an accurate 
representation of public opinion. The views of the public are not necessarily the same 
as the claims being made by powerful interests and active campaigners. To this end, 
the claims have to be recognised to be as much tactical – i.e. the claims that the 
groups thought would help them achieve their goal – as representative.  Hepburn [48] 
looked at the ways in which the referendum was discussed in online forums, for 
example. He noted the ways in which ‘no’ campaigners had been observed 
“‘supporting each other online’ and endorsing others’ comments and ‘harassing’ any 
‘Yes’ campaigners who came online” [48 pp60]. In fact, a ‘No’ activist associated with 
the manchestertolltax.com website acknowledged to him that ‘they had organised their 
supporters from across the country’ [48] to interact with this debate. 
Whilst the two ‘sides’ did not represent homogenous constituencies of opinion, there 
were overarching themes that characterised the arguments being made. We cannot, of 
course, assume that businesses and organisations who opposed or supported the 
plans necessarily signed up to all the claims made.  
Within the set of viewpoints and campaign angles there are many stances that directly 
contradict. Where those against the plans argued that the congestion charge would 
benefit the rich, for example by ‘keeping the roads free for the rich’ (Figure 7.3) for 
whom the £5 proposed cost would be proportionally less of their income, those in 
favour argued that the plans contained socially progressive elements and that it would 
be the poorest who would benefit most from better public transport links and reduced 
air pollution. 
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Figure 7.3 Photo of Manchester Against Road Tolls (MART) campaign billboard. 
Photo: anonymous 
An early advert claimed that the plans were tantamount to telling nurses, firemen [sic] 
and teachers to get ‘On Yer Bike’, (Figure 7.4) highlighting that the congestion charge 
would represent a higher proportion of the wages of lower paid workers, whilst those 
campaigning in favour organised a ‘Tour de TIF’ bike ride covering the whole of 
Greater Manchester and highlighting the potential for ‘cleaner, cheaper and more 
convenient public transport options will take cars off the road and make cycling safer 
and more enjoyable’ [49]. On the one hand, then, the plans could result in more people 
feeling that they needed to cycle to work, on the other, this may help to make cycling a 
more attractive option and have health and environmental benefits. 
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Figure 7.4 Photo of Manchester Against Road Tolls (MART) campaign billboard. 
Photo: anonymous 
In the discourse against the plans, concerns about the costs to businesses were 
raised. Kellog’s, for example, welcome the public transport improvements in principle 
but argued that ‘they will not help us move cornflakes’ and therefore, the Manchester 
Evening News reported, that it would be ‘too difficult to shift cereals from its Trafford 
Park plant’ [50]. A coaster produced by the Greater Manchester Momentum Group 
argued that ‘even if you don’t commute by car, additional costs to business will be 
passed on through shops, pubs and other outlets’ (Figure 7.5).  
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Figure 7.5 Campaign coaster produced by Greater Manchester Momentum Group 
Conversely, campaigners in favour highlighted the potential positive impact on 
businesses and the economy in terms of the costs of congestion and unreliability, as 
shown in the ‘That’s why I’m voting Yes’  billboards (figure 7.6): ‘I can’t afford to be late 
for any more meetings’ and ‘I want my deliveries to be on time.’ It was also part of the 
core messaging of the ‘yes’ campaign to claim that 30,000 jobs in the area were at risk 
from congestion and that there is a general case for the economic health of the area: 
‘We can all have a laugh, but we are talking here about tens of thousands of people’s 
jobs and the future of the region’ [51]. ‘Even drivers will benefit the argument goes,’ 
reported the Manchester Evening News, ‘because they will see their journey times 
reduced.’ [51]   
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Figure 7.6 Campaign billboards produced by the YES Campaign. Design by 
Creative Concern, Photography by Graeme Cooper 
Costs to individuals were also highlighted. A viral video showed a man standing at the 
bar in a pub with a beer and a shark coming up behind him and taking the drink with 
the message ‘If the Congestion Charge comes in, it could cost you up to £100 a 
month… Don’t let the Congestion Charge be last orders for your pint.’ Conversely, pro 
campaigners highlighted that many people would not have to pay the charge, such as 
older people travelling off peak: ‘And it is those who will not pay who feature in the Yes 
Campaign’s big poster campaign – the off-peak traveller, the bus and train commuter – 
with the message “9 out of 10 people won’t pay” [51] (see Figure 7.7 for example of 
this slogan). The campaign attempts to convince people that the charge is the fairest 
way to pay for public transport improvements.’ 
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Figure 7.7 Leaflet produced by YES Campaign. Design by Creative Concern, 
Photography by Graeme Cooper 
Those opposed to the plans referred to the financial risk the city was taking, with half 
the GMTIF money being in the form of a loan, paid back through the congestion 
charge. Conversely, campaigners in favour of the plans highlighted the opportunity and 
potential of the investment: an example being the leaflet ‘You wait years for some 
transport investment and then £3 billion comes along at once. Going to let it go by?’ 
(Figure 7.8). Whilst opponents tended to frame this as a ‘bribe’, proponents tended to 
emphasise the opportunity presented by the money. 
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Figure 7.8 – Leaflet produced by Clean Air Now 
An objection raised by those opposed was the extent to which the congestion charge 
apparatus would entail tracking drivers: an early advert contained the words ‘We’re 
watching you: Tagged, Tracked and Taxed. The Toll Tax’. The ‘yes’ campaign did not 
focus on this issue, but did seek to reassure people that the mechanism would not be 
‘tracking’ per se, but would instead register whether cars pass cordons during the 
hours of charging: there was an implication, however, that this was a reasonable price 
to pay for the potential benefits of the scheme. 
A prominent theme for the proponents of the scheme was a reduction in the emissions 
from transport and the impact upon air quality and climate change. Clean Air Now, a 
coalition of groups and businesses, focussed their campaign on this, arguing that the 
plans, in controlling traffic levels and introducing newer more modern buses, would 
contribute to reducing air pollution. A campaign towards the end of the period featured 
children in gas masks with the caption ‘Is a congestion charge too much to pay for 
clean air?’ [52]. 
These environmental issues did not feature in the campaigns of those opposing the 
plans. There were some examples of attempts to downplay the significance of air 
pollution for asthma and to claim that modern cars are cleaner, for example on the 
Manchester section of notolls.org.uk: ‘They say that tolls are needed because it would 
result in a tremendous improvement in air quality and eliminate asthma and other 
respiratory diseases. But there is little evidence that external air pollution is a 
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significant asthma factor though it may have an effect on those who already suffer from 
it. Cars are many times cleaner than they were…’ [53]  
It is noteworthy that the arguments presented by those in favour of and opposed to the 
proposals are often two sides of the same coin, or the same issue perceived differently: 
whilst the charge might ‘keep the roads free for the rich’, it would allow for 
improvements that would give low income commuters more options not to drive; whilst 
the plans seemed to be saying ‘on yer bike’ to poorer commuters, facilitating active 
travel can be seen as a positive way of boosting health and social inclusion; whilst the 
loan element was a risk, the funding was an opportunity; whilst businesses may incur 
charges, the proposals would help to reduce congestion therefore potentially helping 
businesses make their deliveries on time. 
Fundamentally, these opposing viewpoints can be seen to reflect different 
conceptualisations of justice. The close association between mobility and freedom 
translated into claims of social justice, albeit differently framed. The justice claims of 
the opponents can be understood to stem from an emphasis on mobility and a close 
association between this and private car use. The potential for the charge to affect 
poorer drivers the most was highlighted, with the implication that the roads would, in 
effect, be ‘free for the rich’ (Figure 7.3) and the poor would not be able to access work 
without resorting to the other modes of transport, such as the bicycle (Figure 7.4).  
Conversely, the proponents tended to present non-car modes positively. Clean Air Now 
(CAN)’s ‘Tour de TIF’ cycle ride highlighted the opportunity to promote cycling as a 
healthy and sustainable mode. Leaflets produced by CAN suggested a ‘yes’ was an 
early Christmas present and highlighted the extent of the public transport investment. 
They argued that it would be the poorest in society, who do not have cars, who would 
benefit the most from the investment. They also tended to make reference to 
environmental issues such as air pollution and climate change, and argued that quality 
and reliability of journeys would improve.  
The claims, then, represent alternative approaches to addressing social exclusion 
related to car dependency. The ‘no’ campaigners argued that making car travel more 
expensive exacerbates social exclusion, whereas the ‘yes’ proponents argued that, by 
investing in alternatives and reducing the growth of car use, policy can seek to be more 
inclusive.  
6 Communicating complex proposals 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed above and previously [4], the proposals were relatively complex. 
Although GMTIF was routinely presented as a congestion charge plan, the reality was 
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that it was also a major public transport investment package that was contingent upon 
the introduction of a congestion charge. The project was “characterised by a 
complicated message” [3] in a field of planning that is already a complex, and 
contested, field.  
This discussion is premised on the assumption that the media have a significant effect 
on opinions and attitudes [54]. “In our media-mediated world”, argue Brand and Fischer 
[55 pp13], “small chunks of information sell… information for the masses has to be 
made accessible and straightforward, which pushes towards a simplified picture of a 
complex scenario.”  
Whilst the level of complexity reflected a level of sophistication that made the scheme 
more precisely targeted at congestion, and this should arguably have made it easier to 
justify and ‘sell’, the reality was that this complexity appeared to hinder rather than help 
its passage through political and public discourse. 
Others have commented on the lack of penetration of some of the more complex 
elements of the plans, and highlighted a degree of simplification. Vigar et al., in their 
survey of media in the run-up to the vote, agree that “it is apparent that many 
dimensions of GMTIF were under-explained” [2]. Concerns over the clarity of 
communication have led some to question the extent to which people fully understood 
the plans and, in particular, the longer-term implications [34]. “Very few people”, argued 
Roy Newton of the Joint Transportation Policy Team, “got the message that a 
significant investment in public transport was the major component, and even fewer 
people knew that public transport investments would have to be fully implemented 
before the congestion charge would begin” [interviewed in 53]. Gaunt, Rye and Allen 
made a similar observation about Edinburgh’s proposed two-cordon system:  ‘It was 
clear that it was too complicated to be understood, never mind supported, by a majority 
of the public’ [30 pp100] 
There are several reasons to suppose that the public received a rather simplified 
version of the plans through publicly available discussion [4]. Firstly, there was a 
particular focus on the congestion charge element of the proposals with the process 
repeatedly referred to with variations on ‘congestion charge referendum’. This is clearly 
unsurprising, and certainly with the benefit of hindsight. £3 billion of investment in 
transport is not in itself controversial and therefore the vote was always going to be 
primarily about the congestion charge element. Vigar et al. agree, also finding that the 
improvements were often presented as a ‘sweetener’, with the congestion charge as a 
‘bribe’ [2]. This framing was common from early in the process, an example being “The 
government is offering Greater Manchester up to £3bn for public transport 
improvements in return for the peak hour only charge of up to £10[sic]” [57].  
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Secondly, the plans themselves were routinely simplified, in both campaign materials 
and media reports, particularly the financial aspects. The complexity of the charging 
system created opportunities for simplification. Some advertising on billboards, beer 
mats and viral videos repeated annual and daily figures, typically £5 per day and 
£1,200 per year: in each case this was the maximum charge and, as discussed above, 
was contingent on time and direction of travel, but individuals would have to dig into the 
detail to find this. 
The official ‘yes’ campaign, which could have broadened the debate to draw attention 
to the wider benefits, seemed to be pushed to respond at the level of how much the 
individual would pay. It circulated leaflets in the run-up to the referendum and these 
included information on the public transport improvements, but the core messaging of 
these and the billboard adverts that accompanied them was ‘9 out of 10 people won’t 
pay – will you?’ (Figure 7.7) apparently countering the ‘hitting your pocket’ focus of the 
opponents by appealing to those who would not, given their travel patterns or personal 
situations, pay the charge.  
Thirdly, comparisons with the London system belied the comparative complexity of 
GMTIF. The GMMG coaster ( Figure 7.5) states that it would “create the world’s largest 
congestion charging zone – the area within the M60 motorway – that’s 80sq miles 
compared to the original London zone of 8sq miles” – yet the schemes were quite 
different, with London’s based on a zone and Manchester’s around two cordons.  
Throughout the almost two-year period of debate there are examples of potentially 
misleading information, whether wilful or not. One example is the M.E.N. front page in 
March 2007 “Congestion Charge, you say NO” on which it was reported that “two out of 
three reject plans to bring in pay-as-you-drive” and “but 59 per cent of you back move 
[to congestion charge scheme] – if it brings cash for Metrolink” [57] (Figure 7.9). The 
plans did include funding for Metrolink, so the headline would more accurately have 
read ‘you say YES’. Whether intentional or not, such reporting would not have helped 
the public to clearly understand the proposals, and again seemed to consider the 
congestion charge in isolation from the proposed public transport improvements. Some 
media organisations openly ran against the proposals campaigns. This is not to argue 
that the media consistently misrepresented information or was always against GMTIF. 
Rather, it is to highlight the charged and potentially confusing way in which the details 
of the GMTIF were communicated to the public. 
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Figure 7.9 Front page of Manchester Evening News, 21st March 2007 (extraneous 
news items removed). 
Also of interest in seeking to understand how the plans were communicated is the 
ways in which road users are framed. Given the focus of the media on the congestion 
charge element of the plans, ‘the driver’ seemed to take centre stage in media 
coverage, implying a simplified conceptualisation of mobility. The repeated headlines 
and claims like “Drivers to Pay £1,200” a year were simplifications of the proposals and 
belied the potential for public transport investment to create feasible alternatives for 
many ‘drivers’. One of the first headlines in the M.E.N., for example, was “Is THIS really 
an option for drivers?” with a photo of a crowded tram; implying not only that being a 
‘driver’ is an identity, rather than a performance of the practice of driving, but also that 
public transport was in some way not good enough for them. However, as King et al. 
[58] argue, although the charging is likely to “harm most drivers, no one is only a driver” 
– a ‘driver’, or their family, could benefit from being able to use a new tram route, or 
benefit as a parent or resident from lower traffic levels. Constructing and perpetuating 
this identity of ‘driver’ can be seen to be problematic, considering that a core principle 
of sustainable transport is a shift from emphasising one mode (‘uni-modality’) to 
embracing plurality (‘multi-modality’) [11], such that the mode of transport is determined 
by the demands of a particular journey rather than habitual use. 
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Some proponents did question this. After the M.E.N. launched a survey to let ‘drivers’ 
report problems with congestion, Manchester Friends of the Earth, the Community 
Network for Manchester and the Environment Network for Manchester signed a letter 
to them arguing that “No one is simply a ‘motorist’ – we all have a range of transport 
modes available to use, depending on the journey we are making” [59].   
Vigar et al. found that in general “the press resorts to a narrow repertoire of words and 
metaphors to define transport issues” [2 pp478] and identified a need to better 
understand how these are interpreted by the public. Brand [22] argues that the 
question that is asked, and by extension the way the question is framed, can delimit 
the perception-space of answers, such that “limits to describe are limits to imagine” [22 
pp67]. It could be argued, then, that a certain poverty of vocabulary was evident in the 
press coverage and such poverty may have translated into a poverty of argument and 
vision.  
7 Political leadership and governance  
Ahmed makes the point that by this time the equipment for congestion charging was 
already available and proven and that ‘the emphasis has shifted to public and political 
acceptability as the key constraints’ [35 pp2]. Clearly part of this challenge rests with 
the decision-makers of a conurbation. Observations above of the GMTIF debate 
present a picture that is a long way from notions of the well-informed electorate and 
communicative rationality [60], and highlight the need to recognise power and 
knowledge disparities, strategic behaviour and deception [61]. They also highlight the 
ways in which governance structures can contribute to inertia in decision-making and 
the limitations of a referendum process in representing opinion on a complex issue.  
It cannot of course be known what the outcome would have been under different 
circumstances, but it is clear that aspects of Greater Manchester’s governance 
undermined efforts to forge a decision to go ahead with these plans. GMTIF was born 
into a fragmented governance setting. The ten local authorities in AGMA (see Figure 
7.10) were a combination of Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative and AGMA 
sought agreement between these political parties in order to progress the plans. For 
this purpose, AGMA amended its normal consensus vote to a majority vote [62] and 
decided, with a majority of eight, to bid for TIF funding. Central Government’s decision 
to award the conurbation the funding was influenced by AGMA being able to 
demonstrate broad support for the proposals, evidenced by an early consultation 
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exercise2 [63]. Nevertheless, the months that followed were characterised by further 
political debates. At the time of the referendum three councils were opposed: 
Stockport, Trafford and Bury [47]. Stockport Borough Council was vocal in its 
opposition [64] and in the period running up to the vote attempted to arrange bus 
advertising to oppose the plans [65].  
 
  
                                               
2 57% of residents surveyed agreed with the principle of paying charges in return for the 
package of public transport investment. 68% agreed that a bid should be submitted to TIF, 
but that no decision should be made on the charging scheme until more details were 
available. 
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Figure 7.10 Map of Greater Manchester showing borough and city boundary and 
neighbouring Counties 
The proposals lacked a high-profile, top-level figure to champion them, in contrast to 
London, where Ken Livingstone personally championed the congestion charging plans, 
and it was he, rather than national Government, who took the political risk [34]. The 
Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Authority (GMPTA) and AGMA were 
expected to maintain a neutral stance, co-ordinating the consultation and disseminating 
neutral information about the plans. In such a charged political climate, they could not 
be seen to be taking sides. Councillor Roger Jones, arguably the public figure most 
closely associated with GMTIF in 2008, lost his seat in the 2008 local elections and 
subsequently stepped down as chair of GMPTA. During the election much was made 
of his involvement with GMTIF. Having publicly supported the plans, this was seen by 
some in the media as something that should “send a message to his colleagues and 
potential successors” [66] and, by Manchester Against Road Tolls, as confirmation that 
“the congestion charge is a cast-iron vote loser” [66].  
It is striking that this political ‘mud’ stuck. Even in June 2011, on re-election, the local 
press referred to him as “Congestion Charge Mastermind” [67] and referred to him 
having previously been “ousted”, illustrating the longevity of the reputational risk of 
supporting a controversial scheme.  This legacy affected the Manchester Labour Party 
as a whole: when the Greater Manchester Combined Authority was created in 2010, it 
was decided that all issues would be decided on a simple majority, except for road 
pricing, which would require unanimity [68]. A local councillor commented that “this is a 
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very good safeguard against Labour leaders and non-elected civil servants within some 
councils trying to force a congestion charge upon Greater Manchester”’ [69]. More 
recently, when Greater Manchester Labour mayoral candidate Andy Burnham was 
tweeted a question ‘What is your stance re congestion charge for Manchester’, his 
response was ‘Completely off the agenda’3 . 
It is also important to shed light upon the interface between business and government.  
A group of prominent businesses in the area established the Greater Manchester 
Momentum Group (GMMG) to campaign for a ‘no’ vote, and another group of 
supportive businesses established United City. Hepburn describes the characteristics 
of opponent and proponent businesses, noting that the former, on the whole, had 
‘economic interests in freight haulage and retail parks located on the edge of the urban 
area’ and included multi-national businesses, including Kellogg’s and Unilever as well 
as major national real estate companies such as Peel Holdings, owners of the Trafford 
Centre, a shopping centre. The latter, he continued, were more likely to be located in 
the city centre of Manchester and ‘whilst numerous were generally not in the same 
financial league as those businesses opposing the proposal’ [48 pp51].  
In 2008, Peel Holdings was allegedly carrying out voter research in the constituencies 
of politicians related to transport, such as Councillor Roger Jones and Transport 
Secretary (Minister of Transport) Ruth Kelly, asking voters if they supported congestion 
charging [70] and, reportedly in one case, if they were aware of the position of 
Councillor Jones on this issue [71]. Another local company, Kellogg’s, was criticised for 
emailing its employees with a ‘cut and paste’ section of text with which to respond to 
the official consultation and reflect their employer’s stance against the proposals [72].  
Hepburn [48], in his analysis of online discussions, observed that ‘the exercise of 
political power being wielded by dominant economic interests’ had muted the voices of, 
in his example, environmental campaigners, and notes that ‘this undoubtedly helped to 
deprive the civic debate of an important environmental dimension.’ 
Whilst businesses have a legitimate voice on policy in a city region, this example 
highlights the sometimes opaque nature of their interventions and the need for a good 
understanding of the ‘behind the scenes’ influences on policy and decision-making. 
Whilst business often has a privileged position in policy-making, as “government relies 
greatly upon business to carry out basic functions such as employing people and 
organising the economy” [73 pp99], its views are not necessarily unbiased or 
representative, and powerful interests with financial resources may “skew the 
outcomes of policy debates” [73 pp99], either directly, as stakeholders, or indirectly by 
                                               
3 Tweet available at https://twitter.com/andyburnhammp/status/821751320797396992. 
Note that Andy Burnham was elected as mayor of Manchester in May 2017. 
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influencing the electorate. Given Hepburn’s observation that national and multi-national 
concerns were disproportionately on the opposing side, one has also to question the 
extent to which this referendum can be seen as genuinely local democracy.  
 
7.1 The referendum 
The decision to hold a referendum, which followed campaigning primarily by 
opponents, appears to have been in part a result of the failure of the ten boroughs to 
reach agreement. Sir Richard Leese, Manchester City Council leader, had not been in 
favour of a referendum, arguing that it “would not work” for such a complex issue and 
preferred the decision to be made through the “system based on elected 
representatives who have to take difficult and important decisions” [74]. Some felt that 
the decision to hold the referendum was an “admission of failure” [56] or buck passing. 
Similarly, in the Edinburgh case, it was argued that the referendum was a “politically 
expedient way to distance the then ruling Labour group from making a decision on the 
congestion charging scheme” [75]. Whilst the Greater Manchester authorities may be 
criticised for lacking decisiveness in pursuing the programme, some local politicians felt 
that the buck had already been passed from central Government [56], which did not 
have the boldness to push congestion charging directly but had instead made anti-
congestion measures essential components of bids to TIF.  
The experience of the referendum illustrates the difficulty of translating a strategic long-
term macro-level decision into individual decisions. It calls into question not only the 
suitability of a referendum process, but also the ability of the democratic system to 
bring about radical change, or, in lock-in [76] terminology, a discontinuity. The binary 
choice, and outcome, of the referendum arguably became a simplified representation 
of a complex issue and did not facilitate deliberation of the finer details, advantages 
and disadvantages, nor was voting able to communicate anything more than a ‘signal’ 
[77]. 
There was also an issue with familiarity with the subject matter. As Pierson [78] argues, 
many participants in politics engage in activities sporadically. He refers to studies that 
indicate that actors who operate in contexts of high complexity and opacity tend to filter 
information into existing ‘mental maps’. This is pertinent to GMTIF: the majority of 
voters will not have engaged in transport planning prior to the referendum and will have 
had only a short amount of time to digest the plans and get to grips with the complex 
set of issues. They will have been bombarded by campaign messages and media 
content which, as has been seen, often did not do justice to this complexity. This would 
also apply to elected members outside of the transport and related committees. At the 
same time as the GMTIF was being debated, and concerns about the extent of the use 
of public finances and the debt were being raised, Greater Manchester Waste Disposal 
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Authority (GMWDA), serving nine of the ten AGMA boroughs, had signed a deal for 
waste services over 25 years with the value of £3.8 billion, including a mixture of grant 
funding and finance [79] – such high-value packages are not alien to local government.  
8 Developments following the referendum 
This section outlines developments in transport policy relevant to GMTIF following the 
rejection of the plans in 2009. Although some had emphasized that there was no ‘plan 
B’ for transport in the conurbation, the debate surrounding TIF had emphasized the 
importance of transport to the region’s economic prosperity and AGMA asked the Clerk 
to the Authority and the Chief Executive of the PTE to ‘examine alternative approaches 
designed to create investment capacity in transport and to maximise the contribution 
transport could make to the delivery of Greater Manchester’s employment and Gross 
Value Added growth potential.’ [80] 
It was recognized that the decision to withdraw from TIF precluded Greater Manchester 
from accessing associated funds from DfT. An initial options document highlighted the 
potential for a workplace parking levy and supplementary business rates as a 
fundraising tool, but this was rejected by AGMA executive in 2010 [81].  AGMA 
chairman Lord Peter Smith related this decision to the economic downturn [81].   
To the extent that the 2009 GMPTA4 document ‘Post TIF Investment and Funding 
Strategy’ [80] represents local government thinking about ways forward, it suggests a 
business and economy focus, referring to transport as a ‘growth constraint’. The 
exercise of applying to and planning TIF furthered the evidence base for public 
transport investment had added to the bottom drawer of planned schemes. The 
document recommended the establishment of a Greater Manchester Transport Fund 
with a clear focus on economic growth: ‘to focus scarce existing and potential new 
sources of funding on the growth and productivity agenda’ [80 pp20].   
A later report [82] detailed the components of this fund, which was established in May 
2009. The GMTF, it stated, is a total investment package of £1,512 million and is 
described as a ‘Major Transport Scheme Prioritisation and Funding Strategy’ [83]. This 
comprised £448 million of Regional Funding Allocation; £165 million grant from the DfT 
relating to the South East Manchester Multi-modal Strategy (SEMMMS) road scheme; 
a Block LTP funding over a period of 9 years from 2010/11; up to £775 million from a 
combination of borrowing, and partly from local/third party contributors. In Local 
Transport Plan 3 it is stated that TfGM will repay the borrowings from a combination of 
Metrolink net revenues, annual ring-fenced levy contribution, and local revenue 
                                               
4 Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Authority (now consolidated under Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority) 
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contributions [83]. This is noteworthy since it means that despite debt being one of the 
concerns that apparently influenced the referendum result, GM pursued a partly 
finance-based package, and public transport revenue, rather than congestion charging, 
was part of the payment strategy.  
The GMTF had a list of capital projects attached, many of which are recognizable from 
the original GMTIF plans. Metrolink extensions are included but not the additional 
expansion to Trafford Park and the Trafford Centre. At the time of writing, work is 
beginning on this line [84], with funding through an earn-back model in which extra 
funding is secured if certain levels of economic growth are achieved [85]. Some, but 
not all of the new interchanges and busways mentioned in GMTIF made it into GMTF. 
Additionally, four road building projects were amongst the priority schemes5. 
In terms of capital spend then, the authorities were able to find funding for some major 
schemes, particularly the Metrolink extensions, but not to provide all that was proposed 
under GMTIF. Other elements, like personalized journey planning, cycle infrastructure, 
walking routes and yellow school buses do not feature in the plans. The funding 
amounted to around half of what would have been available under TIF and, as would 
have been the case with TIF, about half was a loan. Interestingly, the loan is being paid 
back through Metrolink revenue and Council Tax rather than revenue from a 
congestion charge. There is no ‘stick’; in fact, extra road capacity being allocated in 
funding could be seen as a nod to the motoring lobby. It is also important, when 
considering the significance of GMTF as a response to GMTIF that much of this money 
already existed in Greater Manchester or the North West region, in the form of Council 
Tax or the Regional Funding Allocation. GM has also managed to attract other 
transport-related funding and to gradually roll out other improvements in, for example, 
cycle infrastructure, but this has been in response to standalone Government grants, 
such as the Cycle City Ambition Grant of £20 million and the Clean Bus Technology 
Fund of £0.68 million [86], rather than a coordinated package of measures. 
Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) superseded GMPTE in 2011. Its 
Consultation Draft of ‘Greater Manchester Transport Strategy 2040: A Sustainable 
urban mobility plan for the future’ [87] is a reasonable starting point from which to view 
the conurbation’s ongoing plans for transport. The organization clearly recognizes the 
need for integrated transport planning and for modal shift away from private car use 
and recognizes, to an extent, a role for demand management: ‘We will focus on 
measures that encourage people to travel, or freight to be moved: at a different time; 
on a different part of the network; or to change to a different mode to make more 
efficient use of available capacity, particularly during peak periods’ [87 pp16]. Whilst 
                                               
5 South East Manchester Multi-modal Strategy (SEMMMS) route, the Mottram Bypass and 
Glossop Spur, Ashton Northern Bypass Stage 2, and Wigan Inner Relief Road.  
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this is a policy goal to which a congestion charge could contribute, there is no mention 
of charging or of any real constraints on car use or parking. Whilst there is recognition 
that ‘many of the negative impacts of transport, such as congestion, high emissions, 
noise and road traffic casualties, are a consequence of our over-reliance on the car…’ 
[87 pp20], its responses to this can be classified as ‘carrot’ rather than ‘stick’. 
This is not to say that there have not been policy steps in the direction of a more 
sustainable and multi-modal city, not least the Oxford Road bus priority scheme, which 
facilitates cross-city bus travel as well as featuring segregated dedicated cycle ways 
heralded as ‘Dutch style’ and, most relevantly for this discussion, closes a busy city 
centre route to general traffic between 6am and 9pm seven days a week [88]. Whilst a 
single example that must be viewed in the context of the wider 2040 strategy, this does 
at least show some willingness to limit space available to the private car. 
9 Lessons and implications for road pricing 
This section develops the themes discussed above with a view to drawing lessons from 
GM’s experience. This experience, and outcome of the referendum, highlights the 
extent of public scepticism towards road pricing and serves as a reminder of the 
powerful lobby that exists to challenge measures that are seen to penalise ‘the 
motorist’. What then could Greater Manchester do differently if revisiting plans that 
involve road pricing, what can other cities learn from its experience, and what does 
Greater Manchester’s experience contribute to our understanding of car dependency? 
These lessons concern the political and public acceptability of the plans rather than the 
plans themselves: the efficacy of the package was never put to the test. Whilst these 
lessons do not assume that other cities would hold a referendum – in fact it is 
suggested here that they should not – it does assume that there will be a need to win 
over public and political support: the introduction of road pricing is a socio-political as 
well as a techno-economic process. 
The GM referendum was the product of particular circumstances, a particular economic 
and political climate, and a unique set of plans. It formed a human story, with passions, 
fears, irrationalities and agendas much in evidence– in hindsight if not at the time.  
Whilst we should not necessarily expect the same politics to play out in the same way 
in another setting at another time, it is important not to discount the national context, 
and to recognise that any local debate will be situated in ongoing national, and 
international, developments. Campaigns against restrictions on driving, be they anti-
speed cameras, anti-parking restrictions, or anti-road pricing, are in evidence 
nationally, and we have seen that these campaigns infiltrated the local discussions. We 
have seen that multi-national concerns were active in the opposition campaigning. 
Similarly, concerns about air quality, climate change and fossil fuel dependency are 
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national and international concerns. One of the major players in the ‘yes’ campaign 
was Manchester Friends of the Earth, part of a network of Friends of the Earth groups 
nationally. Whilst locally rooted, GM’s experience is also part of ongoing dialogues on a 
larger scale and provides an indication of the types of issues that are likely to arise. 
Our first lesson then, and a first step in any proposal for road pricing, relates to 
the importance of understanding each city’s own configuration and its place in a 
national context, and of identifying important actors, arguments and agendas 
that are likely to shape a debate on this approach. This also implies that car 
dependency cannot be understood as a purely local phenomenon. (See also 
chapter 4). 
When reflecting with people involved in the debate, their first response is normally that 
there should not have been a referendum and that this was the death knell of the 
plans. The limitations of referenda in dealing with complex issues over a diverse 
population have been discussed above. It may have been possible to plough ahead 
with the plans had political consensus been achieved but it is not clear what the 
political fallout from such a move would have been and if difficulties that followed would 
have resulted in the plans being stopped or diluted. 
The decision to hold a referendum can be seen as the result of a particular political 
situation in which agreement could not be reached and this in itself therefore relates to 
the city’s particular characteristics. The enduring implication of the referendum, 
however, is the knowledge of a clear public vote against the proposals and this makes 
it very difficult in the future for politicians to engage with this issue. Sustainable 
transport planning requires a diverse toolkit that includes carrots and sticks, and the 
political reaction to the referendum result has been to in effect rule out certain 
categories of stick: the simplistic nature of the vote limits the potential for complexity in 
transport planning not only at the time but over years to come. A referendum is an 
extremely limited way to make such a complex decision, provides no guarantee 
of the most sustainable or fair outcome, and limits the potential to revisit road 
pricing in the future. This is not to discount democracy – as opponents of 
referenda are commonly accused of - but to point out the relative benefits of 
persevering through existing democratic structures. 
It is worth noting, however, that not all referenda are equal. There was potential to hold 
a referendum after charging and improvements took place [35] to demonstrate the 
benefits before the vote, as was the case in Stockholm (chapter 14) and Milan (chapter 
18). The difficulty for GM’s situation was that the investment in public transport was 
dependent on finances from the congestion charge. Similarly, voting could have been 
restricted to those inside the charging rings, therefore affording greater weight to the 
opinions of residents than commuters from outside. This may have been an option, 
although the political climate would have made it very difficult to convince opponents 
that this represented the level of democracy being demanded. These possibilities 
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notwithstanding, referenda remain an extremely limited way to accommodate and 
balance diverse views.  
Timing then becomes an important issue. If Greater Manchester was not influenced by 
national timescales to develop and approve the plans, could a slower pace have 
enabled a calmer, more deliberative decision-making process in which the ten Local 
Authorities could have arrived at a mutually acceptable plan, consulting the population 
in a more conventional way and not putting it to a binary vote? This would have 
avoided the disadvantages of a referendum, although it seems clear that the same 
issues would be fought, and other ways may have been found by opponents to derail 
the plans.  
The difficulty in securing agreement can be seen in part to reflect the fact that GMTIF 
was a response to national priorities, and was presented as such. If it were part of an 
ongoing strategy for GM, or if more time had been allowed to develop one, then there 
would have been more time to develop consensus and the congestion charging policy 
may not have been so unexpected. In reality, GMTIF was seen by many to be an 
opportunistic grab of national funding. There is a lesson here for national policy to 
avoid being counter-productive by expecting towns and cities to develop 
relatively quick and competitive responses to national calls. There is a related 
lesson for conurbations to be proactive in developing transport policy 
strategically, allowing time and democratic space for the involvement of 
businesses, citizens’ groups and political representatives: far from an 
appeasement process – which opponents may cast it as - this should be seen as 
a collaborative development of transport policy and an opportunity to get to the 
roots of car dependency. 
One of the things that is striking on reflection is how quickly the debate centred around 
the congestion charge and how quickly it became polarised, even before it was known 
that a referendum would make the final decision. It has been noted above that this was 
inevitable - since it was the congestion charge that was the controversial element and 
without it calls for a referendum would have been extremely unlikely. This has 
important and problematic implications. 
Firstly it has been established that many votes were contingent on the quality of public 
transport and the media attention on the congestion charge limited the extent to which 
people knew about the public transport improvements. I have spoken to people since 
the vote who had no knowledge that there were substantial public transport 
improvements proposed. Even if the congestion charge was the most controversial part 
of the package, knowledge of the whole package was – or should have been - an 
important part of decision-making. It is therefore insufficient to simply argue that, since 
the congestion charge was the most controversial element, it was somehow acceptable 
that this was the media’s focus. 
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Secondly, debate air time and column inches focused on the congestion charge and 
there was little if any opportunity to discuss the detail of the public transport 
improvements. The other parts of the plans were denied both oxygen and critical 
attention. It is fair to say that much of the energy of the pro-GMTIF campaigners 
therefore went into defending the charge and countering claims rather than building 
and promoting an alternative vision for transport in the conurbation of which the 
congestion charge was one element. This contributed to certain perverse outcomes 
such as cycling activists saying they would vote against the plans because the cycling 
plans were not as they would have liked. The lesson is to ensure that the 
congestion charge is seen in the context of a wider strategic transport goal for 
the area. 
This, as the GM experience indicates, is not a simple task and implies the need 
for a proactive approach to communication. This should be based on full 
knowledge and anticipation of a backlash against the plans, but also avoid being 
on the defensive. The Greater Manchester experience at least helps to identify 
the likely points of contention.  
Important elements of such a communications strategy include working alongside 
businesses to develop the plan that meets their interests and reassures them about 
their concerns. This requires time, and therefore relates to the previous points about 
developing transport strategy over time. These businesses then become potential allies 
in selling the plans and it becomes harder for opponents to attack weaknesses. It 
would be naïve, of course, to expect all businesses to become supportive of a 
congestion charge and there would need to be a close eye on anything that could be 
seen to be unreasonable behaviour on behalf of businesses. The GM experience 
indicates that environmental organisations are likely to be allies in this process and it 
would be beneficial to build early and ongoing relationships with them. 
The formation of the proposals would allow for the development of a more informed 
and positive relationship with the media about transport issues, and congestion 
charging in particular. In this process, congestion charging becomes one part of a 
strategy for sustainable transport rather than an individual ‘shock’ on which the media 
fixates. This is not, however, to underestimate how controversial it is likely to be and 
how much proactive work is needed. This demands an ongoing coverage of transport 
in the media and a widening of the narrow vocabulary often associated with it [2]. 
It seems also that the GMTIF package lacked an attractive name. This may seem 
unimportant, but left it open to opponents to, apparently very effectively, impose their 
own media-friendly branding with terms like ‘C Charge’ and ‘Toll tax’ and these helped 
to reinforce the focus on the charging element.  Alternatives like ‘clean air charge’ or 
‘accessibility charge’ may have helped to move the debate to the positive impacts of 
such a charge, but were not forthcoming. 
Page 32 of 40 
 
One of the unknowns when reflecting on the referendum relates to the role of the Local 
Authorities and transport authority: what if there had been stronger, clearer leadership 
from the authorities with outspoken support for the plans? Whilst GMPTA and AGMA 
had submitted the plans in the form of a bid to Government and could therefore be 
assumed to be supportive of them, they were expected to take a neutral role in the 
debate, limited to providing information on the plans. On reflection, this stance did not 
help to dispel any sense that the plans were somehow not to be trusted and were 
being enacted ‘on’ the city, rather than part of its ongoing transport strategy. Close to 
the referendum vote, for example, a TV broadcast purporting to give a balanced 
account of the options was pulled off air following claims of potential bias [4]. It is 
possible therefore that stronger leadership and political consensus on the plans 
may have helped instil a greater sense of public confidence in them. 
An issue that arose in the course of the debate was clarity over the purpose of the 
plans. Whilst the potential to reduce congestion was clear, and this was the primary 
message, claims were made about the potential to improve accessibility and air quality. 
However, it was pointed out that there were no specific elements of the plans that 
related to pollution levels, in particular there were no concessions to low emissions and 
electric vehicles. Apart from a temporary discount on bus fares following the 
introduction, there were also no clear concessions for low-income travellers. It could of 
course be argued that the modal shift resulting from the plans would have helped to 
reduce air pollution, but this was not explicit. As with other perceived weaknesses of 
the plans, these apparent inconsistencies are both a potential source of doubt for the 
voter and weaknesses that can be exploited by opponents. It is also likely to have been 
helpful to be more specific and committal regarding the public transport improvements, 
as Gaunt, Rye and Allen [30 pp100] noted in the Edinburgh context: ‘whilst reduced 
congestion and improved alternatives to the car were abstract, the prospect of being 
charged was very much more tangible’.  The lesson here is to make sure the plans 
and claims about their impact are not inconsistent and that impact is clear rather 
than implied. 
The final point is more difficult and less tangible but important in terms of the societal 
context in which the debate is framed. It is necessary to build a vision of sustainable 
transport and to link this with notions of the good city, and what it is to be a resident of 
Greater Manchester. It is in the interests of opponents to keep the debate at the level 
of whether Josephine public will pay 50p, £1 or £5, or how many times larger the ‘zone’ 
is than London’s. These encourage a focus on the costs to the individual driver rather 
than the broader societal balance of costs and benefits; and also refer exclusively to 
the perceived unfairness of the ‘new’ regime rather than that of the current one, the 
extent of transport provision and who pays for it 
At the time of a referendum it is this ‘new’ regime that is being considered, but its 
fairness can only be understood in the context of the fairness of existing transport 
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provision. Could low-income communities with unreliable and patchy public transport 
and asthmatic children living on busy roads be framed as victims of the current system 
in the same way that ‘drivers’ are framed as victims of road pricing? Are people already 
paying an ‘air pollution tax’ that is imposed on them because there is a lack of 
restrictions on driving? These are vital questions are difficult to raise in a simplified 
debate with simplistic media coverage. This connects with the notion of developing 
transport policy strategically over time and emphasises the importance of education 
and awareness-raising through public engagement. 
This is challenging since it pertains to societal change in how the transport 
system is seen and how fairness is conceptualised in relation to it, but it points 
to widening the debate on transport to make it clear that this is not simply about 
the ‘driver’ verses the rest of society but about how a diverse range of people 
access the services they need, breathe clean air, and are protected from the 
impacts of climate change.  
These points reinforce an understanding of car dependency that transcends the 
individual’s mobility experiences and connects with the ability of the city to adapt and 
transition to more sustainable transport profiles. It hints at a condition of lock-in [76] in 
which cities experience systemic barriers to radical change, and sheds light on some of 
the ways this is operationalised. Poor public transport becomes locked-in, as it erodes 
the public’s confidence in the transport authority’s ability to provide a quality service. 
Businesses that thrive in a car-friendly city flex their muscle when they feel proposals 
may challenge the status quo. Relatively simplistic media coverage reinforces the 
focus on the car and provides a narrow lens through which to view a complex issue.  
With these points in mind, it is worth reflecting on the current situation in GM. A lot of 
the above reflects a holistic and strategic approach to transport planning that takes a 
longer term view and meaningfully engages stakeholders along the journey. If GMTIF 
were proposed now in 2017 would it have a different reception? 
On the one hand, there has been substantial investment in public transport, particularly 
the Metrolink but also bus priority routes, smartcard ticketing is gradually being rolled 
out. Yet congestion continues to be a problem - TomTom have rated it the 8th most 
congested city in Europe for example [89]. There is also increasing awareness about 
air quality and health, as evidenced by the Client Earth legal case [90] in which the UK 
Government was taken to court over its record of tackling air pollution, and the 
Volkswagen emissions controversy in which it was found that cars had been 
programmed to perform better when under emissions testing than on the road [91].  
On the other hand, perceptions and experiences of public transport remain 
problematic, especially in areas that have not enjoyed so many improvements. 
Ironically the expansion of Metrolink could weaken the case for another GMTIF, since 
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residents can see that a ‘big bang’ of public transport has happened to some extent, 
although there is plenty of scope for further extensions of the network. Economically, 
we remain in times of austerity with the potential of the UK leaving of the EU providing 
further uncertainty. A major factor may be ‘devo Manc’ in which the conurbation will get 
increased powers to manage its own affairs, including transport, and a mayor. Andy 
Burnham, who was elected the first Mayor of the conurbation in May 2017, will still 
have to work in conjunction with the ten local authorities, but in principle has the power 
to be a strategic lead. This, combined with the Bus Services Bill progressing through 
Parliament [92], presents an opportunity for greater control and therefore coordination, 
integration and price capping of buses, trams and trains. The 2040 strategy discussed 
above also indicates a willingness to at least in principle accept the need to challenge 
the growth of car use, and the closing of part of Oxford Road (a major Manchester 
thoroughfare running approximately one mile from the city centre through the 
University area to the southern suburbs) to general traffic during the day could be seen 
as an initial step [88,93]. This would be more convincing, however, if there were 
evidence of a strategy for further such developments.  
 
10 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the challenges faced by Greater Manchester in decision-
making around its plans for a package of measures that would include congestion 
charging and public transport investment. It has shed light on some of the ways in 
which party politics, local campaigning and the media contributed to shaping public 
opinion. In looking at related developments in Greater Manchester following the vote, it 
has shown that whilst some of the intentions of the proposals have been realised as 
part of subsequent policy initiatives there remains a reluctance to pursue the charging 
element. As someone who supported the GMTIF proposals, seeing their value for the 
conurbation in social, economic and environmental terms and recognising the central 
role of the congestion charge within them, I note that there is still a need for greater 
investment in public transport and active travel and to recognise that moving towards 
these more sustainable modes requires sticks as well as carrots. Whilst bold action on 
GM’s car-centred transport networks would therefore be welcome, it must be 
recognised that the referendum result makes that more challenging politically than it 
would otherwise be – though it is of course not impossible. Whilst the use of a 
referendum might enable politicians to defer to the ‘will of the people’, the challenges of 
meaningfully addressing the congestion in our cities and moving towards sustainable 
mobility remain. 
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